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In recent years, the slow pace of economic growth, high indebtedness, and high
unemployment registered in most developed economies since 2009 have revived the
debate over the “secular stagnation hypothesis” first formulated by the Keynesian
economist Alvin Hansen in 1938. This return of the secular stagnation hypothesis
occurred in November 2013, when Lawrence Summers postulated that the global
economy was facing a scenario of low growth, low inflation, and a reduction in GDP
per capita due to a chronic insufficiency of aggregate demand. The causes should be
sought not only in cyclical factors associated with a long financial cycle and excessive
accumulated public and private debt, but also in structural changes in the central
economies in recent decades, linked to the rapid slowdown in population growth and
the gradual aging of the population. Finally, other factors also depress demand, such
as the progressive exhaustion of the globalization process and the consolidation of
new labor models. In light of these developments, this paper’s aim is twofold: first, to
perform an econometric panel-data study in order to determine the influence of each of
these factors in explaining secular stagnation in recent years for the selected sample of
countries; and, second, to lay out proposals for reorienting the government intervention
strategies adopted since the onset of the financial crisis to promote consumption and
achieve sustained growth, job creation, and poverty reduction.
Keywords: secular stagnation, consumer motivation, financial cycle, technological innovation, social inequality
INTRODUCTION
In November 2013, Lawrence Summers revived the “secular stagnation hypothesis” first formulated
by Keynesian economist Alvin Hansen in 1938. In doing so, he initiated an interesting debate on the
state of developed country economies after the Great Recession, asserting that the global economy
faced a scenario of low growth, low inflation, and a reduction in per capita GDP due to chronic
insufficiency of aggregate demand.
This scenario is the starting point for the present research, which has a twofold objective. The
first is to identify the short-term and structural factors that explain secular stagnation and perform
an econometric panel-data study to analyze the influence of each one in recent years for the selected
sample of countries. The second is to lay out proposals to reorient the government intervention
strategies adopted since the onset of the financial crisis to promote sustained growth, job creation,
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and poverty reduction. To achieve these goals, one strategy
to be taken into account is that of examining motivations for
entrepreneurship, not only in terms of how the internal or
external incentives provided by companies might contribute, as
discussed in the classic organizational psychology theories of
McClelland (1961) and Herzberg (1970), but also because of the
interest of producing entrepreneurs to contribute to economic
growth and job creation.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The Secular Stagnation Hypothesis:
Origins and Explanatory Factors
The secular stagnation hypothesis was first formulated by
the economist and Keynes disciple Alvin Harvey Hansen
(1887–1975) in his famous speech to the American Economic
Association at its annual meeting in December 1938.1 Hansen
argued that, due to certain structural characteristics (such as
the declining population growth rate and scant technological
advances), economies tended to show a greater propensity
to save than to invest, slowing down economic growth
(Sandoval and Morales, 2017: 58).
Precisely 1 year earlier, in 1937, the American economy had
entered into a strong recession following a period of dynamism
achieved through the implementation of the New Deal. Franklin
Delano Roosevelt had adopted that plan in the spring of 1933
to overcome the serious effects of the Great Depression of
1929 (spectacular increase in unemployment, contraction of
international trade, decline in wages, and a notable loss of
purchasing power).
In keeping with the postulates of Keynesian theory, the
New Deal defended the need for government intervention in
the economy, that is, for the mobilization of public money
to generate economic activity and purchasing power. It had
two main dimensions, economic and social (Lozano, 2004;
Serrano, 2010: 25–128).
(a) The economic dimension addressed the major problems in
three key sectors:
• The financial system, by increasing government control
over banking institutions in order to ensure their
solvency, stimulates the granting of credits for business
investment, and protects investors from possible fraud.
In particular, two important regulations were enacted to
restore confidence in the financial system:
◦ “The Emergency Banking Act” (March 9, 1933)
formulated a program to clean up the banking sector by
which only those entities that proved to be sufficiently
solvent were allowed to operate, granting them a
guarantee from the Federal Reserve that insured 100%
of bank deposits (Federal Reserve, 2019b).
◦ “The Banking Act” (June 16, 1933), better known as
the Glass Steagall Act, created the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation; consolidated the limitations on
1For more detailed information, see Hansen (1939).
branch opening regulated in the McFadden Act of
1927; prohibited commercial banking from participating
in the investment banking business; and provided
for the elimination of interest on bank deposits
(Federal Reserve, 2019a).
• Industry, by encouraging subsidies to industry to encourage
its recovery (“National Industrial Recovery Act” of June 16,
1933), in addition to the undertaking of gigantic public
works projects with a view to industrializing certain areas
of the country (mainly the Tennessee River Valley) and
creating millions of jobs.
• The agricultural sector, through the granting of
compensation, with the primary aim of reducing the
overproduction that had caused the prices of agricultural
products and farmers’ profits to plunge (“Agricultural
Adjustment Act” of May 12, 1933).
(b) The social dimension encompassed intervention in two
major areas:
• Labor, by regulating employer–worker relations, the
minimum wage, and maximum working hours (“National
Labor Relations Act” of July 6, 1935).
• Welfare, by promoting the creation of the first federal
system of unemployment insurance and pensions, aimed
at correcting the considerable existing social inequalities
(“Social Security Act” of August 14, 1935).
However, as noted, most of the gains made during the
economic recovery process beginning in 1934 were lost in late
1937, when the Roosevelt administration began to gradually
reduce public spending and rein its expansionary monetary
policies. The precarious state of the economy became apparent
when, as these government support measures were withdrawn,
unemployment rose from 14 to 19%, affecting >7 million
citizens, industrial production fell by 37%, and family incomes
fell by 15% (Jones, 1980; Redondo, 2015). That was when Hansen
put forward his hypothesis that there had not been a normal
economic cycle, but rather a depression that could become
“secular” if decisive action were not taken.
Indeed, this Keynesian economist claimed that the reduced
possibilities of internal geographic expansion, the observed
decline in population growth (probably due to the severity of the
crisis), and the tendency for new technologies to use less capital
than in the early stages of capitalist development would explain
the inability of investment to generate the demand that would
ensure full employment and the corresponding real output. As a
result, savings would accumulate unused, and economic growth
would plummet unless governments borrowed and spent to
reactivate aggregate demand.
However, Hansen qualified his thesis, considering that the
real cause of economic stagnation was the scarcity of profitable
investment opportunities compared to earlier periods. Therefore,
the solution would not be simply to stimulate demand through
public spending and cheap financing. In other words, it was not
only a problem of demand, but also supply, which the private
sector alone was not capable of solving (Navascués, 2016).
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In short, according to his theory, demand had to be
stimulated, but very selectively, to prevent any public
spending from being diverted to superfluous objectives. To
this end, nothing could be better than a public investment
program that would generate positive side-effects for
consumer spending and private investment, with a view,
in particular, to improving the standard of living of low-
income social groups. At the same time, this spending
program would have to be combined with a flexible tax
program, allowing the basic rates on revenue to be adjusted
within the limits set by the government, i.e., the adoption of a
compensatory fiscal policy, enabling a corrective synchronization
of public spending and taxes with the economic cycle
(Antonelli, 1957).
Additionally, the supply side shortcomings would have
to be corrected by improving education and training and
promoting technological innovation. However, Hansen was quite
skeptical of the government’s management capacity, arguing,
“We have not yet learned to make the Government an
effective, flexible and sensitive instrument in a fluctuating
and highly complex society, in a private enterprise society
in which the State must take on the role not only of
counterweight, compensating for the shortcomings of private
investment, but also as a provider of very important public
services and as an advocate of basic development programs”
(Antonelli, 1957: 24).
The truth is that the economic recession that began in 1937
was short-lived, thanks largely to the immediate and forceful
response of the Roosevelt administration. Disregarding the
Treasury Department’s recommendations to continue the efforts
to balance the budget, it launched a $5 billion spending program
in the spring of 1938 to increase purchasing power.
This change in the orientation of the economic policy
measures implemented enabled the rapid recovery of industrial
production, which grew again to 30%. The economic reactivation
was also later linked to the expenses generated by the Second
World War, which was an important stimulus factor and kept the
level of activity very high.
So, time proved Hansen profoundly wrong, not only because
of the fairly high birth rate of the baby boomers, but above all
because of the high investment accompanied by unprecedented
global growth.2 The secular stagnation hypothesis thus fell into
oblivion for a long period of time.
2Specifically, the war industry became a dynamizing factor in the post-
war American economy, with large companies such as General Electric and
Westinghouse in atomic power plants, IBM in computers, and Boeing in civil
aviation and space programs. This large industrial growth required more labor
force, which contributed to the creation of millions of jobs and a significant
increase in the volume of production. In addition, after World War II, President
Harry S. Truman promoted a program aimed at the gradual suppression of
state control in the economy, which established an ambitious reform of social
expenditure to make it more efficient and less costly. In this way, a welfare state was
built that made it possible to reduce social inequalities, thanks to the approval of
a plan for social housing for families with lower incomes, the control of rents and
agricultural subsidies, and improvements in civil rights, employment, education,
public health, and social benefits. For a detailed analysis of the role of the public
sector in economic activity and its contribution to growth and technological
innovation, see Galbraith (1984) and Mazzucato (2014).
The Current Economic Debate on
Secular Stagnation
However, in recent years, the slow pace of economic growth,
the high level of indebtedness, and the high unemployment
registered in most developed economies since 2009, due to both
the serious damage caused by the Great Recession and structural
changes the economy has been facing for several decades, have
revived the debate over the secular stagnation hypothesis, in both
the financial press and mainstream academic economics circles.
Indeed, in the summer of 2007, the global economy entered
into a major financial crisis, including the collapse of the
housing market, a sharp fall in asset prices, deleveraging of the
domestic and financial sector, strict credit conditions, and a
high degree of political uncertainty and instability. This state
of affairs subsequently triggered a severe economic recession,
indeed, the most intense, problematic, and prolonged of any
experienced in the last 80 years. The crisis was especially
harsh for the countries on the periphery of the euro zone,
due to the excessive accumulated debt (Costas and Arias, 2015;
Nash-Stacey and Karp, 2015).
Nevertheless, as noted, the fragile economic situation that
has prevailed in industrialized countries since 2009 is not
due solely to the effects of the recent systemic financial crisis
and the persistence of large volumes of public and private
off-balance-sheet debt. It is also due to structural changes
that have been underway since 1980, such as the slowdown
in population growth, the falling price of capital goods, and
increasing income concentration, which hinder sustained long-
term growth, i.e., a rate of economic growth compatible with
full employment. The combined action of all these factors
(cyclical and structural) results in excess savings over aggregate
investment, which ultimately leads to a stagnation in economic
activity, accompanied by strong deflationary tendencies (Pérez
and Delbianco, 2015: 53).
Therefore, the return of the secular stagnation hypothesis in
late 2013, at the hands of Summers, a Harvard economist and
former U.S. Treasury Secretary under President Bill Clinton, took
place in a context and in conditions similar to those that Hansen
and other authors of the Keynesian school tried to explain and
understand eight decades ago.
Speaking at the November 2013 International Monetary Fund
(IMF) academic conference in honor of Stanley Fischer, Summers
hypothesized that the world economy was in a situation of
“secular stagnation,” launching an interesting debate on the state
of developed country economies after the Great Recession.3
According to his thesis, in their current structural
configuration, central economies are incapable of simultaneously
achieving satisfactory economic growth and minimum
conditions of financial stability (Summers, 2014a: 29). In
other words, the global economy is facing a scenario of low
growth, low inflation, and a reduction in per capita GDP due
to a chronic insufficiency of aggregate demand. The most
visible manifestation of this phenomenon is the downward
trend in interest rates, reflecting a greater propensity to save
3For a detailed study, see Summers (2013).
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than to invest, which inevitably translates to a loss of economic
dynamism. In addition, the term “secular” used to qualify this
situation implies a process of indefinite duration or, at least, a
very long stagnation (Quirós, 2015).
This structural imbalance between aggregate savings and
investment gives rise to the chronic insufficiency of demand and,
thus, provides support for the secular stagnation hypothesis. It
is basically due to the following long-term changes registered in
central economies in recent decades (Pérez, 2015):
(a) The rapid slowdown in population growth since 1960, in the
United States, Europe, and Japan, which has logically been
accompanied by a reduction in the workforce. This, in turn,
has had a negative impact on capital accumulation.
In addition, the notable change in the population’s age
structure, due to the declining birth rate and higher life
expectancy, is a very important factor that could be driving
savings up in the world, to the detriment of consumption,
and, consequently, aggregate demand down. Specifically,
the last 30 years have seen a significant increase in the size of
the population group between the ages of 45 and 64 years.
This group’s economic behavior is strongly conditioned
by the need to maintain a certain standard of living after
retirement and it thus tends to save more. The current
existence of very weak or even non-existent public or
pay-as-you-go pension systems must also be taken into
account in this regard.
In short, demographic variables are clearly hampering
aggregate demand, not only because of lower population
growth in the main developed countries, but also because
of the significant expansion of the population strata that are
more likely to save (Martí, 2017a).
(b) The fall in total factor productivity (TFP)4 caused by a
paralysis in technological innovation, especially following
the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, and/or because
new information technologies and digitization do not have
as significant an impact on real economic activity as
the manufacturing technologies of the twentieth century
did (e.g., internal combustion, electricity, automobiles,
aviation, telephony, television, lasers, the Internet, or
mobile telephony).
In contrast to this “pessimism” regarding future
technological progress, highlighted by neo-Keynesian
economists such as Gordon (2012),5 other authors,
such as the University of California economic historian
Eichengreen (2014) and Eichengreen et al. (2015), argue
that the reasons for the stagnation of production and
4According to the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE), TFP is the difference
between the production growth rate and the average growth rate of the factors used
to obtain it, which are weighted by the share of national income that each factor
accounts for. In other words, the sum of the contributions of productive factors
(labor and capital) and TFP is the same as the rate of change of GDP.
5In addition to the paralysis in technological innovation, Gordon (2014) argues
that economic growth will continue to be slow over the next 25–40 years because
of four “headwinds”: an aging population; lower secondary school and university
completion rates, coupled with greater difficulties for university graduates to find
jobs suited to their education; inequality in income distribution; and high public
indebtedness.
total productivity should be sought in the failure of some
developed countries, such as the United States, to invest
in infrastructure, education, and training, rather than in
the scarcity of potentially revolutionary innovations.6 In
other words, to achieve sustained economic growth, it is not
enough to increase investment in R&D; it is also necessary
to ensure that the economy is capable of reallocating
production factors to their most efficient uses.
Additionally, one widespread argument notes that the
service sector, where productivity growth is significantly
slower than in the industrial sector, tends to account for an
increasing share of advanced economies, in terms of both
real output and job creation (Bach, 2016).
(c) The growing inequality in income and wealth distribution7
is another key explanatory factor for the greater aggregate
marginal propensity to save witnessed in developed
countries in recent years. Indeed, because the economic
actors with the highest incomes are more likely than the
poorest ones to save money rather than spend it, increasing
inequality will dampen consumption, the financial position
of the middle class, and, ultimately, the growth of aggregate
demand (Guillén and Ontiveros, 2014).
Summers also recognized that this structural imbalance
between aggregate savings and investment is further
explained by the increase in gross corporate savings, due
to the rising share of profits in the income of major
industrialized countries since the mid-1970s and early
1980s. In particular, this is the result of rising globalization
since 1980 and the increase in technological progress over
this period (Summers, 2014b).
Although they do not explicitly adhere to the secular
stagnation thesis, other authors, including the French
economist Thomas Piketty, argue that the strong increase
in social inequality registered in developed countries over
the last three decades, with the large-scale implementation
of free-market postulates and financial deregulation, will
inevitably translate to continued low economic growth
accompanied by low population growth in the coming
decades (Piketty, 2015).
(d) Other factors depressing aggregate demand, including the
gradual exhaustion of the globalization process, which, after
accelerating dramatically over the last 20 years, especially
as a result of the Uruguay Round of the GATT-WTO8 and,
6In fact, some authors, such as Mokyr (2014), professor of economics and history
at Northwestern University, argue that technological progress, particularly in areas
such as computing, materials, and genetic engineering, has significant indirect
effects on productivity growth via the tools that scientific research provides.
7The degree of inequality in a country is usually determined based on the available
monetary income. Specifically, the distribution of this income is usually measured
by defining population segments, starting with those with the lowest income, and
determining what proportion of income corresponds to each one. To this end, the
most commonly used indicator is the so-called Gini coefficient, which measures
income inequality among the citizens of a given territory, usually a country. This
index ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 is the maximum equality (all citizens have the
same income) and 1 is the maximum inequality (all income is owned by a single
individual). Thus, the closer the coefficient is to 0, the less inequality there will be;
conversely, the closer it is to 1, the more the inequality will grow (Torres, 2016).
8The eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations (Uruguay Round) resulted in
the largest reform of the world trading system since the creation of the General
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above all, China’s entry into the Organization on December
11, 2001,9 has come to a virtual halt. As a consequence, the
world stock of productive capital is already largely adapted
to the current scheme of comparative and competitive
advantages in the international trade system. This will
probably be associated with lower rates of economic
growth due to the progressive exhaustion of this source of
generation of new investments (Martí, 2018).
Finally, another factor that could currently be contributing
decisively to the increase in savings worldwide and,
therefore, to the stagnation of aggregate demand is the
consolidation of new employment models. These models are
largely characterized by less employment stability, i.e., an
erosion of permanent employment coupled with a strong
trend toward temporary employment. These temporary
contracts are being used by entrepreneurs not only to cover
companies’ short-term needs, but also as an instrument
for providing external and internal flexibility to their
productive organizations.
The intensely precarious nature of this new employment
(the so-called “gig economy”) has had a clearly negative
impact on public social security systems and, more specifically,
on unemployment protection systems, unbalancing them
financially. One immediate consequence of the greater labor
risks assumed by a good number of workers would be an increase
in the level of savings, in order to cope with any contingencies
that might arise and, thus, weaker consumption. This behavior
might also be more likely to manifest among workers with higher
salaries, since, in their case, public sector insurance would cover
a smaller part of their previous labor income (Cavas-Martínez,
2005; Martí, 2017b).
In short, although the international economic situation
has improved comparatively in recent years, and has done
so quite generally across countries and geographical areas,
all these structural factors, coupled with the more typically
short-term factors associated with the effects of the recent
global financial crisis and the previously high levels of
indebtedness (Koo, 2014), have considerably reduced domestic
and corporate investment, significantly weakening aggregate
demand (Table 1).
On the other hand, in recent years many economists have
defended the effectiveness of actions on aggregate supply to
increase the productive potential of economies and achieve
sustainable long-term growth. Thus, as mentioned at the
beginning, it is possible to mitigate the current weakness of
aggregate demand by considering the relevance of personal
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948. It began in Punta del Este
(Uruguay) in 1986 and concluded in Marrakech (Morocco) on December 15, 1993.
Despite the challenges to be overcome, the Uruguay Round made significant efforts
to establish a more open and transparent global trading system, both because
of the large number of participants (123) and because of the importance of the
issues addressed: the negotiation agenda on the access of goods to international
markets; the first steps in the liberalization of international trade in services; the
drafting of principles to guarantee the intellectual property incorporated in the
goods and services exchanged and foreign investments in any country; and, finally,
institutional agreements to replace the GATT with the World Trade Organization
(WTO) (Zapata and Gabriele, 1994).
9For detailed information, see Adhikari and Yang (2002).
TABLE 1 | Explanatory factors of secular stagnation.
Short-term factors Structural factors
• Long-term financial cycle,
accompanied by banking
crises and growing tensions
in global financial markets.
• Demographic factors:
XRapid slowdown in world population growth.
XGradual aging of the world population.
• Declining TFP
• Excessive accumulated
public and private debt
(balance sheet recession).
• Increasing inequality in income and wealth
distribution
• Other factors depressing aggregate demand:
XGradual exhaustion of the globalization
process.
XConsolidation of new employment models:
less job stability.
factors of entrepreneurship, as the motivation of achievement,
being a characteristic of the personality that allows to relate with
the success of the created companies (Barba and Atienza, 2011).
As noted at the start of this paper, certain factors related
to individual entrepreneurship can partially mitigate this
effect, such as the motivation of achievement characteristic of
personalities associated with the success of created companies
(Barba and Atienza, 2011).
In this context, Shapero (1985) considers that the decision to
start a company depends on two types of personal perceptions
having to do with values related to culture, socioeconomic status,
family, education, and influential people: the perceived feasibility
and the perceived desirability of starting one.
Many theories of human motivation have sought to identify
the factors that define the entrepreneurial behavior that improves
a country’s economy and that drive successful behaviors in
this regard, using the personality of entrepreneurs as a source.
For example, Paturel (1997) identifies three factors: the future
entrepreneur’s aspirations, his or her skills and resources, and the
opportunities afforded by the market.
These types of incentivized strategies (to encourage
entrepreneurs) work on several fronts: the decline in
productivity, which they slow, albeit moderately, since the
entrepreneur him or herself is the beneficiary of the work’s
results; supply (direct for this worker profile); and demand, since
rental income increases and so, thus, will consumption.
RESULTS
Empirical Analysis
The main objective of this empirical study is to determine which
factors explain a possible secular stagnation of the economy.
To this end, the impact of such factors on economic growth is
quantified using the statistical method of panel data analysis10
with a sample of 12 countries (sufficient statistical information)
around the world11 and time series from 1998 to 2017.
10The econometric modeling software used has been Stata.11 (Statacorp, 2009).
11The 12 selected countries are those that the World Bank considered global
powers in 2017, as they had registered the highest level of GDP per capita over the
period: Brazil, China, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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An econometric panel-data model includes a sample of
economic agents or stakeholders (individuals, firms, banks,
cities, countries, etc.) for a given period of time, i.e., it
combines both short-term and structural data (Mayorga and
Muñoz, 2000). Specifically, here this model is used to study the
impact of a set of short-term and structural variables on the
economic growth of the 12 selected countries. The countries
selected for the model lend themselves to the fixed-effects
estimation method.
With panel sectional time series data, the most commonly
estimated models are probably fixed effects (FEs) and random
effects models, so is important to establish which of them is the
most adequate.12 Several considerations affect the choice between
a FE and a random effects model (see Allison, 2009) but, in this
case three points have been considered.
Firstly, the nature of the variables that have been omitted from
the model are correlated with the variables in the model so, FE
models may provide a means for controlling for omitted variable
bias. Secondly, the subjects (countries, in this case) change across
time and there is within-subject variability in the variables, so
a FE model is more convenient. Thirdly, the subjects are not
randomly selected, but they are selected with a specific criterion.
Specifically, those considered as world powers by the World Bank
in 2017 (by registering a higher level of GDP per capita). So, the
preliminary choice of countries determines that the FEs be the
most appropriate method.
In short, for all that, the estimation must be made with FE.
The variables were selected to represent the short-term and
structural factors explaining secular stagnation shown in Table 1.
In all, 18 variables were selected (Supplementary Table 1):
• Variables representing short-term factors. Initially, a total of
four variables representing the financial cycle and excessive
public and private debt were considered, of which two were
significant for the final models: stocks traded (total value
as% of GDP)13 and total debt (current euros) (Table 2).
• Variables representing structural factors. Initially 10
variables were considered, representing demographic
factors, factors depressing aggregate demand, growing
inequality in income and wealth distribution, and TFP.
12The Hausman test is used to determine the most appropriate estimation
method – FEs or random effects (REs) – in order to obtain the most robust
parameters in each case. In this analysis no test has been made because of
an algebraical problem. However, the characteristics of the sample mentioned
determine that the FEs be the most appropriate method.
13The value of the stocks traded is the total number of shares traded, both domestic
and foreign, multiplied by their respective matching prices. Only part of the
transaction is considered. Companies admitted to listing and admitted to trading
are included in the data. Data are year-end values.
Of these, five were ultimately significant for the final
models: total unemployment (% of total workforce),
population aged 65 years or over (% of total), TFP growth
(original), TFP growth (adjusted), and TFP at current
prices (USA = 1) (Table 3).
• Variables representing economic growth (and thus secular
stagnation). Initially, a total of four representative variables
were considered, of which three were ultimately significant
for the final models: GDP growth (annual %), GDP growth
per capita (annual %), and GDP per capita (US$ at current
prices) (Table 4).
As seen in the correlation matrix (Supplementary Dataset
1), there is no serious multicollinearity among the independent
variables because the most variables correlate from very slight
to moderate (0.004 ≤ r ≥ 0.5). This indicates that the different
measurement scale of the independent variables does not affect
the relation among them. However, following the guidelines by
Afifi et al. (2012), the indicators with a correlation >0.5 are not
included in the same econometric model.
The regression model results (Supplementary Dataset 2) by
using panel data estimation are shown in Table 5. These models
suggest that it is valid (P = 0.05 or P = 0.01) to study and analyze
GDP (measured by GDP growth, GDP growth per capita, and
GDP per capita) through the structural and short-term factors
considered (Tables 2, 3).
Next, three exploratory models of GDP were proposed
because three variables representative of GDP were finally
significant for the definitive models: GDP_P (Model 1),
GDP_PCP (Model 2), and GDP_PC_N (Model 3) (Table 4).
Furthermore, considering that the aim of this empirical study is to
demonstrate which factors explain a possible secular stagnation of
the economy, GDP is the most appropriate endogenous variable.
Based on an analysis of these estimates of the most
representative models, the following can be concluded:
• Model 1: ĜDP_P = 6.488− (0.167 ∗ P65_P)− (0.263 ∗ UNE)
+ (1.28 ∗ TFPO): The percentage of annual GDP growth is
directly explained, to a greater or lesser extent, by the total
productivity growth of the original factors,14 directly, and
14The Total Economy Database (TED) is structured in two parts: TED1, containing
output, labor, and productivity data, and TED2, containing growth data. This latter
part, in turn, includes two versions of the data: (1) The Conference Board (TCB)
Adjusted: For the calculation of the adjusted version of data, GDP growth rates
are adjusted for several countries. More specifically, GDP deflators are used for
three countries with significant ICT production and trade: China, Japan, and the
United States. This translates to higher real GDP growth rates for these countries
compared to the original data version. (2) The Conference Board (TCB) Original:
Based on official GDP data for the period after 1990 that do not reflect the rapid
declines in ICT goods.
TABLE 2 | Variables corresponding to the short-term factors explaining secular stagnation.
Indicator Factor Database Acronym
Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP) Financial cycle World Federation of Exchanges database ST_P
Stocks traded, total value (current US$) Financial cycle World Federation of Exchanges database ST
Total debt Excessive debt Datosmacro.com TD
Total debt (per capita) Excessive debt Datosmacro.com TD_PC
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TABLE 3 | Variables corresponding to the structural factors explaining secular stagnation.
Indicator Factor Database Acronym
Unemployment, total (% of total workforce) Aggregate demand International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database (updated 2017) UNE
Gini index Inequality World Bank, Development Research Group GINI
Population growth (annual %) Demographics (1) United Nations Population Division: World Population Prospects; (2) Census
reports and other statistical publications by national statistics bureaus; (3)
Eurostat: Demographic Statistics; (4) United Nations Statistical Division:
Population and Vital Statistics Report (various years); (5) U.S. Census Bureau:
International Database; and (6) Secretariat of the Pacific Community: Statistics
and Demography Programme.
PG_P
Population aged 65 years and over (total) Demographics World Bank. Based on the United Nations Population Division’s World
Population Prospects age/sex distribution (updated 2017)
P65
Population aged 65 years and over (% of total) P65_P
Population aged 0–14 (% of total) P14
TFP at current prices (USA = 1) TFP Penn World Table, version 9.0a CTFP
TFP at constant national prices (2011 = 1) RTFPNA
TFP growth (adjusted) The Conference Board (TCB). Total Economy Database. TFPA
TFP growth (original) TFPO
aFeenstra et al. (2015).
TABLE 4 | Variables corresponding to indicators of secular stagnation.
Indicator Database Acronym
GDP growth (annual %) World Bank national
accounts data and OECD
national accounts data
GDP_P
GDP growth per capita (annual %) GDP_PCP
GDP per capita (current US$) GDP_PC_N
GDP per capita (constant local
currency)
GDP_PC_R
indirectly by the unemployment rate and the percentage of
the population aged 65 years or older.
• Model 2: ̂GDP_P_PCP = 6.316 + (1.63e − 07 ∗ TD) −
(0.168 ∗ UNE) − (0.255 ∗ P65_P) + (1.244 ∗ TFPA):
The second model, the percentage growth of annual GDP
per capita is explained, gradually from a greater to a
lesser extent, by the adjusted TFP growth, directly, and
indirectly by the percentage of the population aged 65 years
or over and the unemployment rate. Total debt had a
positive impact.
• Model 3: ̂GDP_PC_N = 82772.01 + (30.846 ∗ ST_P) −
(71329 ∗ CTFP)− (499.877 ∗ UNE): In the third model, the
total value of stocks traded (as a percentage of GDP) has a
direct impact on changes in nominal GDP per capita and
counteracts the negative effect exerted by unemployment
and TFP (at current prices).
Additionally, the interpretation of the standardized
coefficients15 obtained in three models (Table 5) makes
it possible to conclude which structural and short-term
15When measurement scale of the independent variables is different (Tables 2,
3), standardized coefficients must be used to interpret and compare their effects
on your dependent variable. The standardized coefficients obtained in the three
models are not an output of Stata software, but have been calculated directly from
the unstandardized coefficients along with the standard deviations of the variables
factors explain the behavior of GDP (and, consequently the
economic secularization of developed economies) for the
established period to the greatest extent. The interpretation
is simple: the higher the value of standardized coefficients,
the bigger the effect of the factor on GDP. It can thus be
concluded from these models that the short-term and structural
factors explaining the economic secularization of developed
economies could be summarized, in order of relevance (∗), as
follows (Table 6).
If these models are considered as a whole, clear conclusions
can be drawn:
(1) Except for the income and wealth inequality factor (GINI),
the other indicators (financial cycle, excessive debt,
demographic characteristics, fall in TFP, and other factors
depressing aggregate demand such as unemployment)
seem to significantly explain secular stagnation in
advanced economies.
(2) TFP is the factor that most positively affects GDP growth,
except in Model 3, where the endogenous variable to be
explained is not the growth rate but the nominal value
of GDP per capita.
(3) The structural factors explain secular stagnation to a greater
extent than the short-term ones. Two of the structural
factors are of particular importance: the unemployment
rate (UNE) and the aging of the population (P65_P).
Economic Policies to Combat Secular
Stagnation
The econometric panel-data study performed indicates the
influence of each explanatory factor with regard to secular
stagnation in recent years for the selected sample of countries.
Based on these findings, some proposals can be made to enable




J = β̂J ∗
SD(Xj)
SD(Y)
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TABLE 5 | Regression results: estimation with panel data.
Variable Dependent variable
GDP growth (annual %) GDP growth per capita (annual %) GDP per capita (US$ at current prices)
Standardized coefficients (Student’s t-values)
(1) Model 1: GDP_P Model 2: GDP_PCP Model 3: GDP_PC_N
Stocks traded, total value
(% of GDP)
(ST_P) (SH) 0.118 (2.62)∗∗
Total debt (TD) (SH) 0.159(2.23)∗∗
Unemployment rate (UNE) (ST) −0.312 (−7.27)∗∗∗ −0.206 (−4.30)∗∗∗ −0.123 (−2.59)∗∗
Population aged 65 years
and over (% of total)
(P65_P) (ST) −0.273 (−3.28)∗∗∗ −0.418 (−3.85)∗∗∗
TFP at current prices
(USA = 1)
(CTFP) (ST) −1.045 (−9.96)∗∗∗
Total productivity growth
(adjusted factors)
(TFPA) (ST) 0.743 (19.86)∗∗∗
Total productivity growth
(original factors)
(TFPO) (ST) 0.739 (23.19)∗∗∗
Statistical models n = 228 F = 200.18∗∗∗ R2 set = 0.78 n = 219 F = 108.71∗∗∗ R2 set = 0.73 n = 196 F = 34.33∗∗∗ R2 set = 0.49
(1) Factor the variable represents: (SH), short-term factor; (ST), structural factor. ∗∗P = 0.05, ∗∗∗P = 0.01.
of the financial crisis by the main developed economies to be
reoriented toward the pursuit of sustained growth, job creation,
and poverty reduction.
The worsening of the financial crisis in 2008 included the fall
of large financial institutions in the United States and Europe,
increased government support of the financial system, and an
increasingly clear reflection of the turbulence of the financial
markets in real economic activity. This situation prompted the
G20 leaders to meet for a summit in Washington, held on
November 15, to analyze the situation jointly, testimony to the
international cooperation effort to implement mechanisms to
emerge from the crisis.
In this first phase of the crisis (2008–2009) the G20 action plan
was based mainly on the following measures (G20, 2008):
(a) Implementation of expansionary macroeconomic (monetary
and fiscal) policies to rapidly stimulate domestic demand:
• At the monetary level, the central banks of the main
economies slashed interest rates to encourage household
and business consumption and investment in order
to boost economic activity and inflation. Additionally,
some central banks, especially the U.S. Federal Reserve
(Fed), implemented unconventional monetary policy
instruments (Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 2019): forward guidance strategies, indicating
the orientation of monetary policy with respect to the
future evolution of official interest rates, conditional on
the prospects for price stability; and quantitative easing
(QE), i.e., purchase of medium- and long-term bonds,
making it possible to raise their prices and, thus, reduce
their market interest rates.
• At the fiscal level, discretionary measures were adopted to
stimulate the economy, mainly based on increased public
TABLE 6 | Explanatory power of factors with regard to secular stagnation.









ST, structural factor; SH, short-term factor. The number of asterisks (∗) before
a structural (ST) or short-term (SH) factor identifies the degree of relevance in
explaining the endogenous variable of each model: one asterisk (∗) means the
minimum degree, two asterisks (∗∗) mean a greater degree, three asterisks, (∗∗∗)
mean a greater degree, and four asterisks (∗∗∗∗) mean the maximum degree.
spending, tax cuts, and aid for the groups and economic
sectors hit hardest by the crisis.
(b) Approval of programs to bail out the financial system
intended to increase its strength and solvency and thus
facilitate the flow of credit to businesses and consumers in
order to reactivate the real economy.
(c) Reform of the international financial architecture, with
the priority of strengthening the regulation, oversight, and
risk management of the international financial system in
order to avoid new systemic crises and mitigate their global
impact should they occur.
As a result of these actions, world GDP entered into a
phase of mild recovery in 2009, with a return to positive
growth in the second half of the year that reached a
high rate (5.4% in real terms) in 2010. Furthermore,
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TABLE 7 | Economic policy measures to combat secular stagnation.
Time scope Economic policy measures and recommendations
1st phase of the
crisis (2008–2009)
• Expansive macroeconomic (monetary and fiscal) policies
to stimulate aggregate demand
• Financial system rescue programs
• Reform of the international financial architecture
2nd phase of the (a) United States
crisis (2010–2013) 2010–2011:
• Unconventional monetary stimulus measures
• Budgetary stimulus measures.
2012–2013:
• New monetary stimulus programs
• Fiscal policy aimed at reducing high levels of
indebtedness
(b) Euro zone
• Expansive monetary policy
• Contractive fiscal policy aimed at correcting the strong
imbalances in public accounts (fiscal consolidation)
• Structural reform programs
• Reform of European economic governance (six-pack,
two-pack, Budgetary Pact, reform of financial
supervision, and creation of the ESM)
Recovery phase (a) United States
(2014–2017) • Monetary policy normalization process
• Fiscal expansion plans
(b) Euro zone
• Expansive orientation of monetary policy
• Advances in the institutional design of the EMU:
creation of the European Banking Union
Future prospects (a) More active fiscal policy
(euro zone) • Increases in public investment at the heart of the euro
zone
• Fiscal consolidation policies and more structural
measures on the periphery (rebalancing the tax burden
and improving public-sector efficiency)
(b) Structural reform policies: Europe 2020 Strategy (smart,
sustainable, and inclusive growth):
• Jobs and careers
• Research and development
• Climate change and energy
• Education
• Poverty and social exclusion
Future prospects (a) Fiscal policy






• Improving the Social Security network
• Human capital formation
international financial markets stabilized, volatility and risk
aversion markedly declined, asset prices rebounded, and
some segments of the capital markets gradually reopened
(Banco de España, 2017b: 71).
However, in Europe, and especially in the peripheral countries
of the euro zone, due to their greater fiscal and financial
vulnerability and worse prospects for economic growth, this
recovery process was derailed in early 2010 by the emergence
of the first episodes of the sovereign debt crisis, caused by the
distrust surrounding the state of Greek public finances.
The origin of this new phase of the crisis was the
accumulation by these peripheral countries of significant
macroeconomic and financial imbalances during the
previous period of economic expansion (1996–2006). These
imbalances were mainly associated with the high indebtedness
of the private sector, soaring home prices, the excessive
concentration of credit in the construction sector and real estate
development, overdependence on external financing, and the
accumulation of competitiveness losses in their economies
(Banco de España, 2017a).
This instability in the euro zone’s sovereign debt markets,
which resulted in higher yields on the peripheral countries’ public
debt and a considerable increase in the risk premium, hampered
their capacity for budgetary adjustment and the recovery of
economic activity.
In this environment, the economic policies implemented from
2010 on in the United States and Europe became markedly
divergent:
(a) In the United States, the Fed continued to adopt
unconventional monetary stimulus measures, based on the
expansion of the QE program. QE2 was announced on
November 3, 2010 and lasted until June 2011. It consisted
of the purchase of 600 billion dollars in Treasury bonds,
with the aim of keeping interest rates low, making real
estate more affordable, and slightly increasing inflation.
New fiscal stimulus measures were also implemented in the
area of fiscal policy.
The worsening of the economic crisis in 2012 and
2013 led to the approval of two more programs in the
area of monetary policy: Operation Twist, an extension
of QE2, consisting of the purchase of Treasury notes to
influence the economy’s long-term interest rates; and QE3,
consisting of new purchases of mortgage-backed securities
and Treasury bonds.
However, there was an important change in the direction
of fiscal policy strategy during this period, basically geared
toward reducing the high levels of public deficit and public
debt generated by the weakness of real economic activity.
(b) In the euro zone, especially since mid-2012, due to the
serious relapse of economic activity, an expansive monetary
policy has continued to be implemented. This policy has
mainly been based on reductions in the official interest
rates by the European Central Bank, auctions of long-term
loans to credit institutions, and reductions in the cash ratio
(European Central Bank, 2018).
However, fiscal policy took a clearly contractive turn
beginning in 2010, due to the growing instability and
uncertainty in sovereign debt markets. During this period,
the main priority of government budgetary strategies,
especially those of governments that had required external
financial assistance, given the explicit conditionality of
those programs, was to correct the heavy imbalances
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recorded in the public accounts (Costas and Arias, 2015). In
addition to fiscal consolidation measures aimed at reducing
the public deficit and redirecting public debt toward a
sustainable path, multiple structural reform programs were
also implemented covering many areas, including the labor
and product market and the public and financial sectors.
In short, this package of fiscal austerity and reform measures
sought to achieve more competitive and efficient economies in
order to boost sustained growth and job creation, sound public
finances geared toward sustainability, a less indebted private
sector, and a banking system with a greater capacity to provide
credit to the real economy and support recovery (Montoriol-
Garriga, 2015; Rosnick and Weisbrot, 2015).
In addition, from 2010 onward, in order to ensure the stability
of the European Economic and Monetary Union, an in-depth
reform of European economic governance was carried out, based
mainly on initiatives aimed at strengthening the surveillance
of budgetary policies. The main objectives were (a) to achieve
an appropriate balance between the sustainability of public
accounts and the need to maintain the stabilization function of
fiscal policy, (b) to reform the structure of financial supervision
in the Union, and (c) to create a permanent mechanism
for safeguarding financial stability of the Eurozone (European
Stability Mechanism) (Subdirección General de Economía
Internacional, 2012; Eur-Lex, 2014; European Commission,
2019; Callejas et al., 2017; Ministerio de Economía Industria y
Competitividad, 2019).
All the measures implemented since 2010 allowed for
increased deleveraging of the private sector, improved labor
markets, increased confidence, and reduced instability in
financial markets, which translated to a significant change in
growth dynamics by the end of 2013.
Thus, in 2014, the world economy embarked on a path of
gradual recovery, with the developed economies receiving a
particular boost, thanks to the recent strong performance of
international trade, linked to the greater strength of investment
(European Central Bank, 2015–2018).
This favorable outlook is also supported by three fundamental
factors (Banco de España, 2018):
(a) In contrast to the normalization process followed by
the Fed’s monetary policy, the European Economic and
Monetary Union has maintained an expansive orientation
in this area. Indeed, since spring 2014, the Governing
Council of the European Central Bank has been deploying
a broad package of measures to avoid the risks to real
economic activity arising from the prolongation over time
of an excessively low inflation rate.
These actions focus on four basic strategic lines (Banco
de España, 2016): the establishment of a negative interest
rate for the deposit facility16; the communication and
publicity policy for future monetary policy orientations;
16The Eurosystem’s standing facility, which counterparts (the euro zone credit
institutions with which the Eurosystem conducts certain monetary policy
operations) may use to make overnight deposits with a national central bank
remunerated at a pre-specified interest rate (Banco de España, 2019).
the implementation of specific programs aimed at favoring
the proper functioning of transmission mechanisms
through banking intermediaries and credit supply; and the
implementation of a QE program, consisting of the large-
scale purchase of private and public assets.
(b) The approval of fiscal expansion plans in the
United States, which include a tax cut and increased
infrastructure spending.
(c) Important advances in the institutional design of the
European Economic and Monetary Union with the
creation of the European Banking Union, which emerged
as a step toward financial integration, i.e., toward
the single market in financial services, and, in short,
toward perfecting the construction of the euro, by
restoring the proper functioning of euro zone monetary
policy and confidence in the European banking sector
(European Central Bank, 2019).
However, despite recent improvements in the international
macroeconomic situation, there are still major pockets of
risk, especially in the euro zone economies. This risk is
mainly associated with uncertainty about the economic
policies implemented in the United States and the process
of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union,
in a context marked by persistently high unemployment
in some countries (19% in Greece and 15.3% in Spain in
2018), low growth rates (1.9% in the eurozone in 2018),
weaknesses in some financial institutions, and an expected
rate of medium-term inflation <2%, despite the recent
upturn in energy prices (1.8% in the euro zone in 2018). In
addition, population aging is more pronounced in European
economies, and productivity growth and fiscal consolidation
are progressing at a much slower pace than in the United States
(Crafts, 2014: 93).
For this reason, and especially as monetary policies are
brought back to normal, a process that, as noted, has already
begun in the United States, since it is in a more advanced stage
of the economic cycle, it is necessary to consider the role that
a more active fiscal policy could play in reactivating economic
activity within the European Economic and Monetary Union
(Wolff, 2014: 149).
In this regard, in keeping with Hansen’s initial approach,
increased public investment in the countries at the heart of
the eurozone, which now have more budgetary room for
maneuver, could have positive effects for all Member States.
Additionally, although peripheral countries must continue
with fiscal consolidation policies to ensure the medium-
and long-term sustainability of public accounts, they can
also adopt more structural measures aimed at rebalancing
the tax burden toward less distorting figures for private
activity and, in particular, to enhance public-sector efficiency
and synergy with the private sector (by better matching
wages to the sector’s productivity, modernizing government
through the incorporation of new digital technologies,
and increasing collection efficiency) (Aspachs et al., 2016;
Banco de España, 2017c).
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Furthermore, given the importance of structural factors
in explaining the sluggishness of global economic activity
in recent years, as seen in the empirical analysis above,
to promote sustained and sustainable long-term growth,
it is essential to continue implementing structural reform
policies in different economic sectors, aimed at boosting
productivity growth and adequately complementing short-
term stabilization policies (monetary and fiscal measures)
(Jimeno et al., 2014).
In this regard, it is worth highlighting the need to
continue making progress on meeting the different objectives
established in the European Union’s growth and employment
agenda for the current decade, i.e., the Europe 2020 Strategy.
The strategy highlights “intelligent, sustainable and inclusive
growth as a way of overcoming the structural deficiencies
of the European economy, improving its competitiveness and
productivity and sustaining a sustainable social market economy”
(European Commission, 2019).
In particular, the action lines of the Europe 2020 Strategy focus
on five main areas (Eur-Lex, 2017):
(a) Employment: achieve a minimum employment rate of 75%
for the population aged 20–64 years.
(b) Research and development (R&D): invest
3% of GDP in R&D.
(c) Climate change and energy: reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by at least 20%, increasing the share of renewable
energy sources in our final energy consumption to 20% and
energy efficiency by 20%.
(d) Education: reduce the drop-out rate to <10% and increase
the rate of higher-education qualifications to at least 40%.
(e) Poverty and social exclusion: reduce the number of
people living below the poverty line or at risk of social
exclusion by 20 million.
At the same time, in order to continue boosting the
real economy, the United States should implement a fiscal
policy aimed at promoting public infrastructure, education,
and R&D with a view to improving productivity, boosting
potential economic growth, increasing the employability of
groups that have lost their jobs, and reducing possible sources
of financial instability. Furthermore, redistributive policies aimed
at reducing inequality in income and wealth distribution
(Berganza and L’Hotellerie-Fallois, 2017), coupled with structural
reforms to improve the social safety net and human capital
formation, would be needed to reduce the secular increase in
the number of unemployed adults over the last four decades
(Glaeser, 2014).
Table 7 offers a summary of the most relevant economic policy
measures adopted at the international level since the onset of the
economic and financial crisis, as well as the main proposals to
reactivate real economic activity.
DISCUSSION
In addition to the more typically short-term factors associated
with the effects of the recent global financial crisis and the
previously high levels of public and private debt, the chronic
insufficiency of aggregate demand, which would support the
secular stagnation hypothesis, can be explained, mainly in
the central economies, by long-term or structural changes in
recent decades. These changes include: the rapid deceleration of
demographic growth and gradual aging of the population; the fall
in TFP; growing inequality in income and wealth distribution;
the gradual exhaustion of the globalization process; and the
consolidation of new labor models that undermine employment
stability, among others.
The empirical analysis carried out in the present research
quantified the impact of these short-term and structural factors
on economic growth by means of an econometric panel-data
study. The sample consisted of the 12 countries around the
world that the World Bank considered powers in 2017, as they
had the highest level of GDP per capita over a 20-year time
horizon (1998–2017).
Tests were carried out, and three final valid models were
selected, all of which explain economic growth.
Of the two groups of factors analyzed, the structural
ones (demographic, TFP, income and wealth distribution, and
employment) had a stronger influence on secular stagnation than
the short-term ones (financial cycle and excessive accumulated
public and private debt).
More specifically, in the three proposed models, TFP proved to
be the most significant variable and the one to most greatly affect
the evolution of growth in the economies under consideration. In
contrast, the unequal distribution of income (as measured by the
Gini index) did not seem to influence secular stagnation, as it was
not significant in any of the proposed models.
Although the cyclical factors, quantified in the behavior of
financial markets and in excessive public and private debt, did
influence economic growth in two of the three proposed models,
their influence was much smaller.
Consequently, given the importance of structural factors in
explaining the sluggishness of economic activity in recent years,
to promote sustained and sustainable growth in the long term,
economic stabilization policies (monetary and fiscal) must be
adequately complemented by structural reform policies.
In view of the difficulty of adopting policies to increase
the birth rate and combat the problem of the rapid slowdown
in the growth of the world population and its gradual aging,
these structural measures should be aimed, in particular, at
improving the employability of the most disadvantaged groups
in the labor market, promoting R&D, curbing climate change
and encouraging energy savings, implementing training and
education programs, and combating poverty and social exclusion.
Certainly, environmental factors and economic policies are
determinant; human motivation also plays a critical role in the
entrepreneurial process (Shane et al., 2003).
Measures and motivational factors must be offered to
support the behavior of people with an entrepreneurial drive
(Ajzen, 1991).
In short, all these policies will ultimately translate to
improved productivity and competitiveness innovation and
entrepreneurship, as key factors in promoting job creation,
raising the potential growth of economies and economic and
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social cohesion. Consumers would thus perceive favorable
expectations and secular stagnation would be avoided.
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